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The subtlety of the English present perfect is the bane of many who must learn the 
language. Semantically, there appears to be little difference between the present 
perfect and the simple past tense. Sentences such as ( la) and ( lb) appear to have 
precisely the same truth conditions. 
( 1 ) a. Uli went to the exhibit. 
b. Uli has gone to the exhibit. 
Both sentences are true if and only if there was an event of Uli going to the exhibit 
which took place at a time prior to the time at which the sentence is uttered. They 
might, therefore, each be given the semantic analysis in (2) , in the style of Davidson 
( 1967) . 
(2) ::J e [e<now & go(e,UIi) & to(e,the-exhibit)] 
There is, however, a pragmatic distinction between ( 1a) and ( lb) ,  which is some­
times described as ( la) 's having a sort of "current relevance." In contrast to simple 
past tense sentences, present perfect sentences are used, it is  said, when the occur­
rence of the past event is somehow relevant to present concerns. It has never been 
clear, however, exactly what this means , or even how to investigate the contrast. 
Fortunately, in addition to this pragmatic distinction, there are a number of 
distributional differences that allow for more direct comparison. One of the most 
well-studied of these was dubbed the "present perfect puzzle"  by Klein ( 1992) . It  
concerns the fact that in contrast to simple past tense sentences , present perfect 
sentences cannot felicitously be modified by "past-time" adverbials .  The contrast 
is illustrated in (3) .  
(3) a. Uli went to the exhibit last week. 
b. *UIi has gone to the exhibit last week. 
One might have expected that, given the synonymy between ( la) and ( 1b) ,  (3a) and 
(3b) would also by synonymous, both having the semantic analysis (4) . 
(4) ::J e [e<now & go(e,Uli) & to(e,the-exhibit) & last-week(e)] 
But, in fact, although present perfect sentences are used to indicate that a past event 
of a certain type has occurred, they cannot, as simple past tense sentences can, be 
embellished with a temporal adverbial to locate this event more precisely in time. 
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The goal of this paper is to account for this contrast, and, by so doing, to shed some 
light on the notion of current relevance. 
Typically, accounts of the infelicity of (3b) tie it to the temporal semantics 
of the English perfect, associating it with restrictions on the modification of cer­
tain temporal parameters (Klein 1992; Hitzeman 1995; Giorgi and Pianesi 1998) . 
While many aspects of these analyses are appealing, they have never been wholly 
successful , and have often been highly stipulatory. In this paper I will derive the 
present perfect puzzle from an entirely different source. The restriction on temporal 
adverbs will be seen to be part of a more general presupposition associated with the 
present perfect. As McCawley ( 197 1)  noted long ago, the present perfect conveys 
a sense of current possibility. If the Monet exhibit is still running, one utters (Sa) 
rather than (5b) , for example. 
(5) a. Have you been to the Monet exhibit? 
b. Did you go to the Monet exhibit? 
Once the exhibit has closed for good, however, (Sa) is no longer felicitous. The 
incompatibility of the present perfect with past adverbials will be shown to follow 
directly from the presupposition associated with this infelicity. 
2. The present perfect puzzle 
The basic fact we would like to account for is the infelicity of sentences such as 
(6a) and (6b) . 
(6) a. *Zach has gone to Boston yesterday. 
b. * Austin has built a deck last summer. 
This is not part of a general restriction on the modification of present perfect clauses, 
as quantifying adverbials can be used to provide information about the number of 
events that occurred, as in (7a) , manner adverbials and locative adverbials can be 
used to provide information about how and where the event occurred, as in (7b) and 
(7c) . 
(7) a. Steven has gone to Boston several times. 
b. Steven has gone to Boston by car. 
c.  Steven has eaten fish in Boston. 
Even certain temporal adverbials can be used to locate the event in time. These are 
either temporal adverbials that relate to times that overlap the time of speech, as in 
(8) , or those that have a kind of indefinite interpretation, as in (9) . 
(8) a. Katrin has read her email today. 
b. Austin has built a deck this summer. 
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(9) a. Uli has drunk beer on Sunday. 
b. Peter has been in Harvard Square at 6am. 
In (8) the adverbials locate the email reading and deck building on the day of the 
utterance and the summer of the utterance, respectively. Note that here the tempo­
ral adverbial must relate to a time interval that includes the time of speech- (8b) , 
for example, is not felicitous unless it is uttered in the summer-and it locates the 
event described within that definite time interval . In (9) , on the other hand, the tem­
poral adverbial need not relate to a time that overlaps the speech time, but it must 
have indefinite reference. In (9a) we learn only that Uli has engaged in Sunday 
beer-drinking, and in (9b) that Peter has engaged in early morning visits to Cam­
bridge. Note that adverbs such as on Sunday and at 6am typically have definite 
interpretations when they appear in simple past sentences :  
( 10) a. Uli drank beer on Sunday. 
b. Peter was in Harvard Square at 6am. 
( lOa) relates to a specific Sunday and ( lOb) to a specific 6am. 
The restriction, then, appears to be that the present perfect cannot be mod­
ified by temporal adverbials that relate only to past times. There are a number of 
things that make this restriction puzzling. First of all it appears to be particular to 
the English-like present perfect and is not evident in parallel constructions in closely 
related languages . In German, for example, both simple past tense sentences and 
present perfect sentences can be modified by past-time adverbials ,  as illustrated in 
( 1 1 ) .  
( 1 1 ) a. Uli besuchte letzte Woche die Ausstellung. 
Uli visited last week the exhibit 
b. Uli hat letzte Woche die Ausstellung besucht. 
Uli has last week the exhibit visited 
"Uli went to the exhibit last week" 
The semantic analysis suggested in (4) appears to be adequate for both ( l la) and 
( l Ib) . ! For English-like languages, however, this is clearly not the case. Further­
more, the restriction appears to be limited to the present perfect. As has oft been 
noted, in non-finite contexts there is no restriction on the temporal modification of 
perfect clauses. In sentences such as ( 12a) and ( 12b) definite past-time temporal 
adverbials are perfectly acceptable. 
( 12) a. Steven must have gone to Boston yesterday. 
b. Peter believes Steven to have gone Boston last summer 
There also appears to be no restriction in past perfect sentences . Sentences such as 
( 13a) and ( 13b) are also perfectly acceptable with past time adverbials :  
( 13) a. (Mary made it to Boston on Thursday, but . . .  ) Uli had left on Tuesday. 
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b. (We went to return books at 12:30, but . . .  ) the library had closed at 
noon. 
This might suggest that the adverbial restriction has something to do with the "pre­
sentness" of the present perfect. Klein's insight, however, was that when the data 
are properly arrayed, it can be seen that past perfect sentences are subject to a simi­
lar restriction, thus making the present perfect puzzle look to have more to do with 
the perfect, and less to do with the present tense. 
Let me explicate this briefly. Temporal adverbials can modify past perfect 
sentences in two ways. They can locate the event described, as we saw in ( 13) .  
They can also be used to specify the time with respect to which the event is being 
viewed, as in ( 14) . 
( 14) a. On Thursday, UIi had (already) left. 
b. At noon, John had been to the canteen three times . 
To describe these two aspects of the temporal semantics of the perfect, Reichenbach 
( 1947) introduced the terminological distinction between the event time-the time 
at which the described event takes place- and the reference time- the time from 
which it is viewed. In past perfects, the event time and the reference time can each 
be specified by a temporal adverbial , as in ( 13) and ( 14) , respectively. What Klein 
noted was that the event time and the reference time cannot both be specified in the 
same clause: 
( 15) a. * On Thursday, Uli had left on Tuesday. 
b. * At 12:30, the library had closed at noon. 
Interestingly, this restriction has very much the same character as the restriction 
associated with the present perfect. If the event time modification is indefinite, as 
in ( 16a) , or relates to a time span that overlaps that denoted by the reference time 
modifier, as in ( 16b) , double modification is possible. 
( 16) a. In 1990, Uli had already been to Boston in the summer. 
b. In July of 200 1 ,  Steve had already given three lectures that year. 
It appears, then, that a definite specification of the reference time plays the same 
role in the past perfect as the present tense itself plays in the present perfect. 2 
On the reasonable assumptions that tense specifies the reference time of 
the perfect and that the present tense is definite and the past tense indefinite, the 
restriction on the temporal modification of the English perfect appears to be char­
acterizable as a restriction on the definite specification of both the event time and 
the reference time, when the former does not include in the later. In essence this 
is the proposal that Klein ( 1992) made (although he does not include the overlap 
condition) . While he attempted to provide a Gricean explanation for why such a 
constraint might hold, he did not derive it directly. In what follows we will take 
up this task, deriving the restriction from a modal presupposition associated with 
(certain uses) of the perfect. 
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3. The modality of the English perfect 
As already mentioned, McCawley ( 1971)  noted that the present perfect in English 
conveys a sense of current possibility. One utters ( 17a) rather than ( 17b) if one 
presumes that it is still possible for the addressee to attend the exhibit. 
( 17) a. Have you been to the Monet exhibit? 
b. Did you go to the Monet exhibit? 
This presupposition has sometimes been characterized as having to do with whether 
the event described could be repeated in the future (Inoue 1979) . Since it is no 
longer possible to eat lunch at the Russian Tea Room in New York, for example, 
( 18a) is infelicitous (to those in the know), while ( 18b) is fine. 
( 18) a. * 1  have eaten lunch at the Russian Tea Room three times . 
b. I ate lunch at the Russian Tea Room three times. 
Following this line of reasoning, one might think that "one time" predicates such 
as to be killed or to eat the last sandwich, which by their very nature can never be 
repeated, should be restricted from appearing in the present perfect. Clearly this is 
not the case ; sentences such as ( 19a) and ( 19b) are perfectly fine. 
( 19) a. John has been killed. 
b. Peter has eaten the last sandwich. 
They illustrate, however, the significant contextual parameterization and qualifi­
cation that this presupposition is subject to. It is clearly not just absolute future 
repeatability that is  relevant, but rather what the speaker and hearer take to be pos­
sible. To utter ( 1 9b) the speaker must assume that the hearer doesn't know that the 
sandwich has already been eaten. In a context in which we are looking at an empty 
plate wondering where all the food went, ( 19b) would be quite odd, but (20) would 
be acceptable. 3 
(20) Peter ate the last sandwich. 
Likewise, if you didn't know that the Russian Tea Room had closed, you would 
have no reason to think ( 18a) odd. And, as McCawley noted, even if the Monet 
exhibit is still open, if it is common knowledge that the addressee is injured and 
will be held up in the hospital until the show closes, then ( 17a) is odd. 
It appears , then, that using the present perfect is felicitous only in a context 
in which the speaker can assume that the hearer takes it to be possible for an event 
of the type indicated in the perfect clause to occur at some time in the future. It is 
difficult to specify exactly how speakers determine what is  being taken to be possi­
ble (see Kratzer's ( 1 981 )  work on the context dependency of modal interpretation) . 
Nevertheless it is usually fairly clear what is appropriate in a particular context. For 
example, when calling home from Europe one might utter (2 1a) ,  but when one is 
already home (or on the way home) , one would utter (2 1b) .  
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(2 1)  a. We have been to Paris and Rome. 
b. We went to Paris and Rome. 
(2 1a) seems to presuppose that we might still travel around, (2 1b) that we are done 
with the trip. Using (2 1b) ,  however, doesn't rule out a future trip, of course, nor does 
(2 1a) suggest that we will return to either of the cities. The relevant sense of future 
possibility is  clearly not absolute possibility or future likelihood, but something 
contextually specified. We will have nothing more specific to offer on this front, 
however. 
The presupposition of future possibility is ,  of course, closely related to the 
lifetime effects discussed by Musan ( 1997) , in which the status (living or dead) of 
the individual denoted by the subject of a sentence plays a role in determining what 
tense is appropriately used in the sentence. So since my great aunt is still alive, but 
my grandmother is not, (22a) is fine, but (22b) is odd. 
(22) a. My great aunt is from New York. 
b. ??My grandmother is from New York. 
(cf. My grandmother was from New York. ) 
In fact, there is significant overlap between the two issues in the literature. One of 
the most famous lifetime-effect contrasts- that in (23)  noted by Chomsky ( 1970) ­
was analyzed by McCawley ( 1971 )  as being a violation of the future possibility 
condition on perfects: 
(23) a. ??Einstein has visited Princeton. 
b. Princeton has been visited by Einstein. 
Since Einstein can no longer make visits, but Princeton can still be visited, (23a) is 
awkward but (23b) is acceptable. As McCawley noted, in contrast to true lifetime 
effects, the presupposition of future possibility is tightly tuned to the semantic con­
tent of the event predicate being used, and not just the status of the subject NP. So, 
for example, although my mother is still alive, she is past her childbearing years. 
Given this ,  (24a) is odd, since it is no longer possible for her to give birth, while 
(24b) is perfectly acceptable. 
(24) a. *My mother has given birth to two children. 
b. My mother gave birth to two children. 
It may seem odd that an element of the temporal/aspectual lexicon, the per­
fect, should have a modal aspect to its meaning. It turns out, however, that it is 
not uncommon for present perfects to have a kind of epistemic modal interpretation 
(lzvorski 1997) . Examples are given in (25) . 
(25) a. Gel -mis -im. 
b. Az sam do�ru . 
Turkish 
Bulgarian 
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c. Jeg har kommet. NOIwegian 
"I have come" OR "I apparently came" 
Whether the modality of the English perfect is related to this kind of modality, and 
whether only present perfects have these kinds of readings is a subject for future 
research. 
In English, at least, the modal presupposition also appears to arise for certain 
past perfects as well .  An utterance of (26) , for example, presupposes that it was 
possible for Mary to go to the exhibit at a time after the time at which we met her, 
the "future" here being with respect to this meeting time and not the time of speech. 
(26) When we met Mary last week, she had not been to the exhibit. 
Continuing the discourse in (26) with (27) results in infelicity, indicating the real 
presence of the presupposition. 
(27) . . .  ??It had closed the week before. 
Note that when the past perfect is not modified, as in (28) , there is no infelicity (and 
no presupposition of future possibility) . 
(28) We met Mary last week. She had not been to the exhibit. It had closed the 
previous week. 
In fact, the presupposition of future possibility appears to arise in exactly those 
uses of the perfect that are subject to the restriction on adverbial modification: the 
present perfect and the modified past perfect. There is no presupposition in unmod­
ified past perfects , and none in infinitival perfects. (29a) and (29b) are perfectly 
natural , even in a context where it is known that the Tea Room is closed for good 
and that the kids are back from their trip. 
(29) a. Peter believes John to have eaten at the Russian Tea Room. 
b. The kids seem to have gone to Paris and Rome. 
We might utter (29b) after helping the kids unpack from the trip and noting what 
they brought back with them; there is no presupposition of future possibility here.4 
We might note in addition that the presupposition of future possibility is 
entirely absent from the interpretation of the perfect in languages such as German 
and Italian which do not evidence the restriction on adverbial modification. That 
these two properties of the perfect- the modifier restriction and the presupposition 
of future possibility-appear so closely related would seem to call for a unified 
account. In the next section we provide one, deriving the former from the latter. 
4. Deriving the adverbial restriction 
We will focus on the present perfect, leaving the extension to the past perfect to 
another occasion. The basic idea is this :  The present perfect takes as complement 
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an event predicate and introduces the presupposition that it is possible for this event 
predicate to hold at a time after the time of speech. Since an event predicate which 
is modified by a past-time adverbial can only hold in the past, such modification will 
necessarily violate this presupposition. Let me illustrate this briefly with reference 
to the contrast in (30) . 
(30) a. * John has eaten lunch yesterday. 
b. John has eaten lunch today. 
In (30a) the event predicate is one that holds of events of John eating lunch that 
are on the day before the day on which the sentence is uttered, while in (30b) it is 
a predicate that holds of events of John eating lunch that are on the day on which 
the sentence is uttered. These two predicates might be represented as in (3 Ia) and 
(3 Ib) respectively. 
(3 1 )  a. A e [eat(e,john,lunch) & yesterday(e)] 
b. A e [eat(e,john,lunch) & today(e)] 
Clearly the presupposition associated with the present perfect- that the predicate it 
applies to can hold of an event that occurs after the time of utterance- is one which 
(3 Ia) cannot satisfy but (3 Ib) can: An event of eating lunch yesterday cannot, so to 
speak, occur at some time after the time of speech, but an event of eating lunch today 
can. It is this simple relationship between the presupposition of future possibility 
and temporal modification that I take to account for the restriction on temporal 
adverbials and for the correlation between this restriction and the presupposition. 
Let us now give a somewhat more formal treatment. We assume the inter­
pretation function [. ] C  assigns meanings to elements of the language with respect 
to a context c. Contexts will be taken to include a specification of speech time and 
location, speaker, addresee, common ground, etc. (Lewis 1980) . We will only be 
concerned here with the time of the context and the world of the context, which we 
will call tc and wc respectively, and with the context set (the set of worlds compat­
ible with the public beliefs of the conversational participants) , which we will call 
csc (Stalnaker 1984) . Meanings will be taken from the the following domains: The 
basic types De (the entities) , W (the possible worlds) , Di (the intervals of time) , 
Dev (the events) , and Dt (the truth values) as well as the functional types , defined 
in the usual way. We assume that there is a function T mapping events to their run 
times, that times are ordered by the relation < and stand in the inclusion relation 
� . Predicates will also be taken to have implicit index arguments - here world and 
time arguments - in the style of Gallin ( 1975) . We will use standard logical formu­
lae to abbreviate meanings . Elements that give rise to presuppositions will be taken 
to have denotations which are partial functions, in the tradition of Karttunen and 
Peters ( 1979) . Let qmr indicate that ¢ presupposes Jr, in the sense that ¢ only has 
an interpretation if Jr is true. 5 
We assume that the "untensed" part of a sentence denotes an event predicate 
with meaning in D (ev (s,t) ) .  Temporal adverbials will be treated as modifiers of 
event predicates which restrict the times with respect to which the predicate holds 
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(much as in Parsons ( 1990» . They have meanings in D« ev (s,t)) (ev (s,t)) ) .  Indexical 
temporal expressions such as yesterday and this week are interpreted with respect 
to the context of utterance, thus the interpretation for the adverbial this week will 
be that given in (32) :  
(32) [this week] C = )'P ),e ),W [P(e)(w) & T(e) is in the week of c] 
Operators such as the modal and the perfect will be functions from event predicates 
to sentence meanings. The future-oriented epistemic modal might, for example, 
can be given the interpretation in (33) (in the style of Enc ( 1 996» . 6 Because it is an 
epistemic modal , the relevant modal base is provided by the context set. 
(33) [might]C = )'P 3t 3w [w E CSc & T(e) � t & P(e)(w) & tc < t] 
Essentially this says that the modal takes a predicate of events , and returns true 
only if it is  possible that this predicate holds of an event that occurs subsequent to 
the time of speech. We can abbreviate this by introducing the relation POSS that 
holds between an event predicate, an interval , and a context that indicates that with 
respect to the context it is possible, given what the discourse participants take to be 
agreed upon, for the event predicate to hold at the interval : 
(34) POSS(P,t,c) = 1 iff 3w 3e [w E cSc & T(e) � t & P(e)(w)] 
Assuming that the temporal orientation of might is a presupposition, the interpreta­
tion of this modal verb can now simply be indicated as in (35) , with " ; "  separating 
assertion from presupposition. 
(35) [mightl = )'P 3t [POSS(P,t,c) ; tc < t] 
Now consider the analysis of (36) ,  in which the event predicate is modified by a 
temporal adverbial : 
(36) Katrin might take out the trash this week 
(36) is true iff there is a W E  W that is part of the context set of c in which there 
is an event e E Dev of Katrin taking out the trash that occurs in w after the time of 
c and on the week of c, in other words, if it is compatible with what is commonly 
believed that Katrin might take out the trash sometime in the remaining days of the 
week of utterance. This seems to be right. 
We can now already account for the fact that it is quite odd to utter some­
thing like (37) . 
(37) *Katrin might take out the garbage last week. 
The adverbial last week is an event-predicate modifier that locates events on the 
week before the week on which the sentence is uttered. 
(38) [last week] C = )'P ),e),w[p(e)(w) & T(e) is in the week prior to c's week] 
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Since might can only apply to an event predicate that can hold at a time after the time 
of utterance- only future times satisfy the presuppositions of might- and the event 
predicate Karen-take-out-the-trash-Iast-week only holds of events that take place 
on the week before the utterance, it is not possible to satisfy the presupposition of 
might in (37) . 
Let us now tum to the present perfect. As we have seen, the present perfect 
appears to presuppose that it is possible that the event predicate it applies to hold at 
a time subsequent to the speech time. Making this explicit, the present perfect will 
be interpreted as a partial function from event predicates to truth values that is only 
defined for those event predicates which satisfy the presupposition and only returns 
true if an event of the appropriate type has occurred. The definition is given in (39) , 
where, again, the " ; "  separates assertion from presupposition. 
(39) [PRES-PERF]e = AP ::Ie [T(e) < te & P(e)(we)] ;  ::It [te < t & POSS(P,t,c)] 
This says that the present perfect presupposes that it i s  possible for an event of the 
given type to occur in the future, and asserts that one has occured in the past. Note 
that we have adopted the Kaplanian assumption (Kaplan 1989) that a sentence is 
true in a context only if it is true in the world of that context. For convenience we 
have folded the application to the context world We into the meaning of the perfect. 
Let us illustrate again with a simple example. (40a) is taken to have the 
logical form of (40b) , and an interpretation such as that in (40c) . 
(40) a. Katrin has taken out the trash. 
b. [PRES-PERF [Katrin take out the trash]] 
c. ::I e [T(e) < tc & take-out(we,e,k,trash)] ;  
::I t [te < t & POSS(AeAw[take-out(w,e,k,trash)] ,t,c)] 
(40a) is only assigned a meaning if there is is a W E W that is part of the context 
set of c for which there is an event of Katrin taking out the trash that occurs after 
the time of c, i .e . ,  if it is possible for Katrin to take out the trash in the future. If 
this presupposition is satisfied, then the sentence is true if there was an event of 
Katrin taking out the trash before the time of c and false otherwise. Note that the 
content of the event predicate Mary-take-out-the-trash shows up in two places, once 
in the asserted content and once in the presupposition. This ,  along with the context 
dependence of the modal presupposition, makes it difficult to pull the assertion and 
presupposition apart in sentences such as (40) . 
In the case of negative sentences, however, the presupposition and the asser­
tion have distinct content. Take (41a) ,  for example, which I take to have the logical 
form of (41b) ,  and to be interpreted as in (41c) . 
(41)  a. Katrin has not taken out the trash. 
b. [NEG [PRES-PERF [Mary take out the trash]] ]  
c. -, ::Ie [T(e) < te & take-out(we,e,ka,tr)] ; 
::It [te < t & POSS(AeAw[take-out(w,e,ka,tr)] ,t,c)] 
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Here the negation is - as is usual - applied to the assertional content, but not to 
the presupposition. What is presupposed in (41a) is exactly the same as what is 
presupposed in (40) , namely that it is possible for Katrin to take out the trash at 
some time following the time of utterance. What is asserted, however, is that she 
has not done so yet, i .e . , that no event of Katrin taking out the trash occurred before 
the utterance time. 
Turning to the present perfect puzzle, we can now straightforwardly derive 
the infelicity of (42) . 
(42) *Katrin has taken out the trash last week 
Presumably (42) has the logical form of (43a) with the perfect taking scope over 
the temporal adverbial , which is interpreted as in (43 b) 
(43) a. [PRES-PERF [Katrin take out the trash last week]] 
b. :3 e [T(e) < tc & take-out(wc,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is on the week before c 's 
week] ; :3t [tc < t & POSS(AeAw[take-out(w,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is on the 
week before c 's week] ,t,c)] 
(43) thus presupposes that it is possi ble for there to be an event of Katrin taking out 
the garbage that takes place both after the time of utterance and on the week before 
the week of the utterance. This is a presupposition that can never be satisfied. Thus 
sentences such as (42) will always be infelicitous , and we have an account of why 
past-time adverbials are incompatible with the present perfect. 
What remains is to account for why present-time and indefinite adverbials 
are not incompatible with the present perfect. I f  the proposal made above is correct 
the account should simply be that they do not give rise to non-satisfiable presuppo­
sitions, and this seems to be the case. Consider (44a) and (44b) . 
(44) a. Katrin has taken out the trash this week. 
b. Katrin has taken out the trash on Sunday. 
Intuitively, in (44a) the presupposition is that it is possible for Katrin to take out 
that trash on the week of the utterance at a time after the time at which the sentence 
is uttered, while in (44b) it is that it is possible for her to take out the trash on a 
Sunday in the future. It appears that the semantics we gave for this week in (32) 
gives us the right result; with (44a) having the interpretation in (45) . 
(45) :3 e [T(e) < tc & take-out(wc,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is in the week of c] ; 
:3 t [tc < t & POSS(AeAw[take-out(w,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is in the week of c] ,t,c)] 
Clearly the presupposition here can be satisfied whenever the conversational part­
ners jointly believe that it is possible for Katrin to take out the trash at some time on 
the remainder of the week. The negation of (44a) also comes out right. Thus (46a) 
has the interpretation in (46b) . 
(46) a. Katrin has not taken out the trash this week. 
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b. -,:3  e [T(e) < tc & take-out(wc,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is in the week of c] ; 
:3 t [tc < t & POSS().e).w[take-out(w,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is in the week of 
c] ,t,c)] 
Here the presupposition is the same as in (44a) , but the assertion is simply that there 
was no event of Katrin taking out the trash prior to the time of utterance on the week 
of utterance. 
For the treatment of (44b) we need to provide an analysis of the indefinite 
interpretation of on Sunday. Presumably this is something like that given in (47) : 
(47) [on Sunday] C = ).P ).e ).w [T(e) is on a Sunday & P(e)(w)] 
A sentence such as (43b), then, presupposes that it is possible for Katrin to take out 
the trash on some Sunday in the future, and claims that she has done it on some 
Sunday in the past: 
(48) :3 e [T(e) < tc & take-out(wc,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is on a Sunday] ; 
:3 t [tc < t & POSS().e).w[take-out(w,e,ka,tr) & T(e) is on a Sunday] ,t,c)] 
Note that the indefinitenss of on Sunday only plays a contributing role the its ac­
ceptability in the perfect. What is crucial is that there are presumed to be Sundays 
after the time of utterance on which Mary could take out the trash. When this is not 
the case, as in (49) , the perfect is infelicitous. 
( 49) Mary has been to Paris on a Sunday in the twentieth century. 
Here the temporal adverbial is clearly indefinite, but since it is not (now) possible 
for Mary to go to Paris on a Sunday in the twentieth century the sentence is odd. 
The crucial semantic fact about adverbials such as this week and on Sunday that 
allows them to combine with the present perfect is that when they modify an event 
predicate, the resulting event predicate is one that can hold both in the past and in 
the future. 
That, then, is the account of the present perfect puzzle. Clearly there are 
important issues that I have not discussed, in particularly concerning the treatment 
of the past perfect. This we will leave for another occasion. As appealing as this 
account is, there are a number of problems that arise directly in connection with 
this type of analysis that we should address before concluding. 
5. Computing the presuppositions of a present perfect 
One of the problems with an analysis of the type just outlined is raised by Chom­
sky's Einstein-sentences, repeated here as (50) . 
(50) a. ??Einstein has visited Princeton. 
b. Princeton has been visited by Einstein. 
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The account of this contrast should go something like this :  Since Einstein can no 
longer visit Princeton (50a) is awkward, but since Princeton can still be visited, 
(50b) is fine. The presuppositions of the perfect are violated in (50a) but not in 
(50b) . For this account to go through, however, the modifier by Einstein in cannot 
be part of the event predicate that the perfect operator applies to in (SOb) , since 
Princeton can no longer be visited by Einstein. If it were part of the event predicate, 
there would be a presupposition violation in (50b) as well .  This fact raises important 
questions , because it suggests that the presupposition associated with the perfect 
cannot be computed directly from the syntactic structure of the sentence. 
As McCawley ( 1971 )  already suggested, and Inoue ( 1979) discussed at 
length, the acceptability of a perfect sentence appears to be sensitive to not only 
the content of the event predicate, but to the topic/focus structure of the perfect sen­
tence and the pragmatic context that it appears in. With focus on the subject NP, the 
Einstein-sentence appears to be acceptable: 
(51)  EINSTEIN has visited Princeton. 
Likewise, as part of a list answer, it is also fine: 
(52) Which Nobel laureates have visited Princeton? 
Einstein has , Friedman has, . . .  
While these facts raise questions about how exactly to compute the content of the 
presupposition for a perfect sentence, they do not show that the presupposition of 
future possibility disappears in these sentences. Rather, they show that the content 
of the presupposition is not exactly what we might expect it to be from looking at 
the surface form. (5 1 )  may not presuppose that Einstein can still visit Princeton, 
but it does presuppose that it is possible for someone to visit Princeton, i .e .  that 
Princeton is not unvisitable. Contrast (5 1) ,  for example, with the infelicitous (53) .  
(53) ??EINSTEIN has eaten lunch at the Russian Tea Room. 
It appears that in (5 1 ) ,  focus has allowed the lexical content of Einstein to escape 
the presupposition and be existentially interpreted, likewise in (53 ) .  But since it is 
not possible for anyone to eat at the Russian Tea Room anymore, (53) is  odd. In a 
similar vein, the entire discourse in (52) seems to have the presupposition that it is 
still possible for Nobel laureates to visit Princeton. If  all the prize winners were to 
die off, (52) would be odd as well .  
It  is not clear to me exactly how to compute the content of the presupposi­
tion, although a number of options seem to be available. In the analysis presented 
above, the presupposition is computed directy from the syntactic structure of the 
sentence. While it appears that this is not always the case, it seems to be a good de­
fault assumption. There are many factors beyond just the syntax and the topic/focus 
structure that go into determining what the presupposition is ,  however, and it is not 
at all clear what exactly goes into this computation. The presence of negation, for 
example, appears to restrict the presuppositional content to being that which is di­
rectly computed from the syntax. In contrast to (52) , for example,  the negative 
answer in (54) is significantly less acceptable: 
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(54) Which Nobel laureates have visited Princeton? 
??Einstein hasn't, Friedman has, . . .  
When negated, (SOb) also becomes much more awkward. 
(SS) ??Princeton has not been visited by Einstein. 
(cf. Princeton was not visited by Einstein) 
Investigation of the various factors at play here promises to be a fruitful domain for 
future research. 
In recent work, Portner (2000) tries to derive both the kind of topic/focus­
based variablity mentioned above and the presupposition of future possibility from 
the pragmatic notion of current relevance, which he takes to be the fundamental 
semantic/pragmatic contribution of the perfect. On his account the modal and tem­
poral components of the meaning of the perfect are kept quite separate. In the 
analysis presented here I have done things quite differently, deriving the temporal 
restriction from the modal presupposition. In fact, I think we can derive the notion 
of current relevance from the modal presupposition as well ,  at least as evident in 
the "hot news " reading. 7 We will conclude with a brief discussion of this .  
When someone utters (56) they seem to be implying that the victory was 
recent, and that it is news to the hearer. 
(S6) The Dodgers have won the World Series . 
I would like to suggest that it is the association of the presupposition of future 
possibility with the conversational common ground that i s  the source of this "hot 
news " implicature. The relevant pragmatic context for a hot news perfect is one in 
which the speaker assumes that the hearer is aware that an event of the given type 
might occur, but he doesn't know that it has occurred, and the speaker exploits this 
presupposition to create the "hot news" effect. 
The fact that (S7a) is a felicitous "hot news" perfect, but (S7b) is not, no 
matter how relevant for our present concerns a Lincoln assassination might be, fol­
lows directly from such an account. 
(S7) a. George W. Bush has been assassinated. 
b. ??  A braham Lincoln has been assassinated. 
(cf. Abraham Lincoln was assassinated.) 
We all know that Lincoln is dead, and so his assassination is  not a future possibility. 
The perfect in (S7b) is, therefore, infelicitous . But to inform someone who didn't 
already know it that Bush was killed, however, the perfect would be fine. It would 
further convey that what is being said is news, i .e . ,  that the speaker takes it Nar 
to be part of the common ground that Bush's death is not a future possibility. The 
"hot news" effect, then, comes from simultaneously asserting that an event has 
happened and presupposing that the hearer takes it to be possible that such an event 
might still happen in the relevant future. Clearly more work is required here as well .  
Nevertheless I hope I have made made plausible a particular conception of how the 
modal presupposition might underly the interesting and mysterious properties of 
the English perfect. 
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6. Conclusion 
I have argued that the restriction on the temporal modification of the present perfect 
is a consequence of the temporal modal presuppositions associated with the perfect. 
In particular, the present perfect presupposes that it is possible for the described 
event to occur at a time after the utterance time, given what the speaker and hearer 
take to be the case. The assertional content of the perfect is that such an event 
occurred before the speech time (or, in the case of a negation, denies this) .  Temporal 
adverbials are taken to be event-predicate modifiers which locate the event in time, 
and therefore this presupposition is violated by temporal adverbials which do not 
relate both to times in the past and to times in the future. 
The conclusions argued for here receive significant support from the ob­
servation that the adverbial restriction appears to go hand in hand with the modal 
presupposition. This is true both cross-linguisticically and within English. In lan­
guages such as German and Italian in which the perfect does not have modal presup­
positions, there is no adverbial modification restriction. Additionally, in contexts in 
which the perfect loses its modal presupposition, such as the infinitival and certain 
past perfects, the restriction on temporal adverbials is lost as well .  What remains to 
be worked out is an account of the interaction of tense with the perfect, a more pre­
cise account of how the content of the presupposition is computed from the surface 
form, and a more thorough treatment of the relationship between future possibility 
and current relevance. 
Endnotes 
* The central ideas contained in this paper were first presented at the Seminar fUr 
Sprachwissenschaft at the Unversity of Ttibingen in July, 200 1 .  Thanks to Uli 
Sauerland and Arnim von Stechow for helpful discussion on that occasion, espe­
cially to Arnim for encouraging me to think about the perfect. Thanks also to the 
SALT XII audience, particular Peter Lasersohn, for comments in Seatle, and to 
Carla Umbach for comments in Osnabrock. 
1 .  There are minor contrasts between preterite and perfect, however. See Klein 
( 1999) and von Stechow ( 1999) . 
2. Indefinite specification of the reference time appears to be impossible. On Sun­
day, Peter had already left cannot mean that viewed from an indefinite Sunday there 
was an event of Peter leaving that was before it. 
3 .  Of course predicates such as eat the last sandwich don't  always refer to unique 
events . One can say John has eaten the last sandwich several times. On this reading, 
of course an utterance like John has eaten the last sandwich again is perfectly fine, 
even in the empty-plate context. 
4. In this context, however, (i) could not be used, although (ii) would be fine. 
(i) It seems that the kids have gone to Paris and Rome. 
(ii) It seems that the kids went to Paris and Rome. 
5. This is simply different notation for the (/J(-rr) of Beaver and Krahmer (2000) , and 
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I intend it to have the same interpretation. 
6. Note that this analysis of might is primarily for illustration and is not intended to 
be a complete. It, for example, ignores the fact that temporal parameter of might 
can be shifted, as in He said he might come. See Condoravdi (2001 )  for extensive 
discussion. 
7. As Kiparsky (2002) notes, this kind of current relevance must be distinguished 
from that associated with resultative perfects . 
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